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The seminal idea of quantum money not forgeable due to laws of Quantum Mechanics proposed
by Stephen Wiesner, has laid foundations for the Quantum Information Theory in early ’70s. Re-
cently, several other schemes for quantum currencies have been proposed, all however relying on
the assumption that the mint does not cooperate with the counterfeiter. Drawing inspirations from
the semi-device independent quantum key distribution protocol, we introduce the first scheme of
quantum money with this assumption partially relaxed, along with the proof of its unforgeability.
Significance of this protocol is supported by an impossibility result, which we prove, stating that
there is no both fully device independent and secure money scheme. Finally, we formulate a quantum
analogue of the Oresme-Copernicus-Gresham’s law of economy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Information Science originates from the sem-
inal idea of the scheme of quantum money due to Stephen
Wiesner [1]. According to his brilliant concept, the ran-
domly polarized photons could in principle represent the
banknote, while the Bank’s secret key represents the ran-
dom choices of polarizations. During verification the
Bank checks and accepts the banknote if the photons ap-
pear to be polarized as they have been designed and re-
jects otherwise. Although it is rather intuitive that due to
quantum no-cloning [2–4] the banknote can not be forged
without disturbing it, this scheme, has been proven to be
secure against counterfeiter only recently [5]. Wiesner’s
scheme bases strongly on the assumption that measure-
ments of the verification are performed according to the
specification. Dmitry Gavinsky [6] has designed a proto-
col powerful enough to drop this assumption. However
security of the latter relies on the honesty of the provider
of the banknotes (a possibly malicious mint).
In this manuscript we initiate the study on security
of money schemes against joined attack of the mint and
counterfeiter who can collaborate by changing the func-
tionality of the inner workings of the terminal that ver-
ifies the banknote. We first observe, that a scheme
of money unconditionally secure against the joined at-
tack does not exist. In spite of this fact, we propose a
money scheme with relaxed assumptions about untrusted
source and untrusted measurements, and prove its secu-
rity against a wide class of attacks. More precisely we
show how to change the verification procedure of Wies-
ner’s banknote in order to assure its security against a
variant of the joined attack - the production and coun-
terfeiting performed in a qubit-by-qubit manner.
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It is easy to see, that protection of Wiesner’s ban-
knotes against the joined attack, demands a sufficient
control over the banknote state’s dimension. At the
same time for the banknote to be protected its state can
not be classical (diagonal in single basis). In both cases
we demonstrate straightforward attacks. We then start
from an observation that the well known quantum cryp-
tographic scheme, the protocol of Paw lowski and Brun-
ner of semi-device independent quantum key distribution
(SDI QKD) [7] matches these two cases. It (i) assumes
that the traveling quantum data have bounded dimen-
sion (in considered case the bound is 2 i.e., we consider
qubits) and (ii) assures, via testing an equivalent of a
dimension witness, that the data are not classical.
We first note, that according to the honest imple-
mentation of the SDI QKD protocol, the sender-receiver
state, is exactly in form of Wiesner’s banknote. We fur-
ther propose that the verification of this banknote should
be performed exactly as it is done during verification of
the SDI QKD protocol. In the latter the honest measur-
ing device does not check correctness of the correlations
in the two polarization bases of the original banknote’s
state, but in the rotated bases [8] as it is specified by the
honest implementation of the SDI QKD protocol.
The security analysis of the SDI money scheme needs
to take into account that the receiver (Alice) in the cor-
responding SDI QKD, is not trusted. In that sense, the
schemes of money are two-party cryptographic problems.
In a single verification of a banknote Alice is asked to give
certain answers (guessing bits of the key of one branch of
the Bank). Upon successful verification, in order to pass
the verification for the second time in the other branch
she can copy the correct answers given from the first one.
We are able to find the necessary and sufficient value
of the threshold θ in corresponding SDI QKD protocol
which guarantees protection against forgery in the SDI
money scheme. Namely, we prove that the owner of a
single banknote can not be accepted in two (or a reason-
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2able, i.e., polynomial in banknote’s length number of)
branches of the Bank, that employs verification with this
threshold θ. It is sufficient and also necessary that the
threshold is the one that in the corresponding SDI QKD
protocol would imply more than a half of the maximal
key rate. It is important to note that in the SDI money
scheme only the preparation and the verification part of
the corresponding SDI QKD is performed, while the pri-
vacy amplification and information reconciliation is not
done. In particular the number of runs is only big enough
in order to collect sufficient data for tomography of the
guessing probability.
Due to the fact that we base on the original SDI QKD
protocol [7], the SDI money scheme inherits the similar
security level, which in our context we call the qubit-by-
qubit counterfeiting. Major property of this attack is that
the malicious mint, during production of Wiesner’s ban-
knote can perform a qubit in a different state than given
in the specification, independently in each round. Later a
counterfeiter can again try to copy the banknote by indi-
vidual copy operations applied on each qubit separately.
It is also vital for the scheme that the collaboration of
the mint and counterfeiter is restricted in a way that mint
does not pass a state entangled with the banknote to the
counterfeiter. We prove the security in this scenario for
the case when the Bank verifies the banknote. We then
present also a bit more relaxed case when the counter-
feiter can lie in some way about the classical data gen-
erated during verification of the banknote. It is known
that the banknote in the original Wiesner scheme needs
to be destroyed. In the considered case by the nature
of measurement test incompatible with the basis of the
banknote the honest verification destroys the banknote.
A number (in fact, more than 20) of various quantum
money schemes has been recently proposed [1, 5, 6, 9–23].
We then ask if the Oresme-Copernicus-Gresham (OCG)
Law of economy (known also as the Gresham’s Law [24–
29]) will be also applicable to the quantum schemes of
money. If so, the Quantum Oresme-Copernicus-Gresham
law would have a form:
Bad quantum money drives out
good quantum one
We exemplify this general hypothesis on the base of pre-
sented scheme: the realizations of SDI money schemes
with acceptance level θ′ ≥ θ would drive out SDI money
schemes with higher acceptance level θ′′ > θ′. This is be-
cause the banknotes in the latter schemes could be more
robust to noise, hence they could in principle by stored
for longer. One can expect that in analogy to the OCG
law, individuals would tend to keep rather the banknotes
that are more robust to noise banknotes, while spending
the less robust once more often.
The manuscript is organized as follows. In Section
II we review previous quantum money schemes both in
private key and public key settings. In Section III we
present the main results of that work, stating a scheme
for a semi-device independent quantum money and pro-
viding impossibility proof for fully device independent
money schemes. In Section IV we discuss a possible quan-
tum analogue of the Oresme-Copernicus-Gresham Law.
We conclude in Section V by comparing our scheme to
the existing ones, discussing the technological difficulties
in possible implementation, and summarizing the paper
with some interesting open problems. Additionally, in
Appendices A, B, and C we present a rigorous security
proof of the scheme, briefly describe honest implementa-
tion in Appendix E, and discuss the amount of required
memory in Appendix F.
II. PREVIOUS WORKS
An idea of quantum money proposed by Stephen Wies-
ner was to our knowledge the first application of the
quantum effects to the information theoretic, in fact cryp-
tographic task. In this section we will discuss the pre-
vious research in this topic using division into private
and public key quantum money suggested by Aaronson
[11, 30]. In the private key quantum money schemes only
the mint itself can verify the banknote. On the other
hand, in the public key quantum money schemes anyone
can verify the banknote using publicly available verifica-
tion procedure, but still no one, except the mint, cannot
copy or create new banknote. We will conclude by giv-
ing (in Figure 1) a comprehensive comparison of different
classical and quantum moneys scheme together with their
security assumptions.
A. Private key quantum money
Around 1970 Stephen Wiesner suggested the first
scheme of unforgeable quantum money. Unfortunately
his paper was rejected few times and finally was pub-
lished in 1983 [1]. Even though Wiesner claimed that
the protocol is unconditionally secure, a full proof for
the most generalized attacks was presented by Molina et
al. in 2013 [5].
Because of the fact that the scheme requires the mint
to maintain a huge database for all produced bills, Ben-
net et al. [9] proposed a modification of the protocol, us-
ing a cryptographic pseudorandom function, to decrease
needed amount of the memory. The question if it is pos-
sible to reduce the database size without imposing any
computational assumptions was analyzed by Aaronson
[30]. Later he formally proved that the answer is nega-
tive and stated so called Tradeoff Theorem for Quantum
Money [31].
Although the above schemes are secure in a regime
in which the mint destroy the banknote after verifica-
tion, allowing to retrieve verified bill is dangerous. So
called interactive attacks were independently proposed
by Aaronson [11] and Lutomirski [32]. Even more so-
phisticated version of interactive attack, based on idea
3Money
quantum
private-key
device independent This work (See III C)
semi-device independent This work (See III)
measurement-device independent See section II A
device dependent See section II A
public-key
delocalized Quantum Bitcoin (See II B)
localized See section II B
classical
digital
cryptocurrencies Bitcoin, Ethereum, ...
centralized CC, online banking, transfers
physical
fiat money USD, EUR, CNY, PLN, ...
commodity money Gold, sliver, salt, ...
FIG. 1. Types of moneys and their security against forgery: commodity money security is based only on its high intrinsic
value. Fiat money’s security depends mostly on secret products and procedures used in the money making process. For
example the paper recipe or the paint chemical composition is kept secret for banknotes. It is worth mentioning that this is
against Kerckhoffs’s principle. Digital money security follows from hardness assumptions for some computational, probably
NP-intermediate, problems. In practice RSA algorithm and blockchain techniques are used for which effective attacks, using
quantum computer, were proposed. Also in case of the public-key quantum money computational assumptions are necessary,
but it is unclear if any concrete scheme remains secure. Finally the private-key quantum money are information-theoretic
secure without any hardness assumptions. Nevertheless we have to consider real life implementation using specific, possibly
untrusted, hardware and software.
of Elitzur-Vaidman bomb tester, was later suggested by
Nagaj et al. [33].
The above mentioned scenarios requires visiting the
mint, or at least having secure quantum channel so
Gavinsky suggested version of quantum money with clas-
sical verification [6]. It is important to notice that in
Gavinsky’s scheme the Bank does not need to trust the
measurement device. Such type of schemes are commonly
called measurement-device independent. Another similar
scheme was also presented by Georgiou and Kerenidis
[34].
Additionally Pastawski et al. [14] and more recently
Amiri and Arrazola [35] analyze more realistic scenario
in the presence of noise and errors.
It is also worth to mention about fundamentally differ-
ent approaches aimed at anonymity. Mosca and Stebila
[12], (see also Tokunaga et al. [10]) proposed quantum
coins in such a way that all coins are identical. Their
scheme uses black box model that makes thorough secu-
rity analysis difficult.
Furthermore Selby and Sikora [23] analyzed unforge-
able money in the Generalized Probabilistic Theories.
It is important to point out that also experimental re-
sults in quantum money field were presented by three
groups of Bartkiewicz et al. [36], Bozzio et al. [37] and
Guan et al. [38] respectively. Although the theoretical
schemes are secure, in the case of real life implementa-
tion new vectors of attack could appear. For example
Jirkov et al. [39] show how implementation by Bozzio et
al. [37] could be attacked.
Finally, soon after the first version of this paper was
published on arχiv preprints repository, Bozzio et al.
[40] presented the result with similar title “Semi-device-
independent quantum money with coherent states” [41].
They result requires stronger security assumptions but is
more focused toward realistic implementations.
B. Public key quantum money
The biggest drawback of all private key quantum
money schemes is that only the mint can verify the bill.
To get rid of this problem, an idea of a public key quan-
tum money, was invented. In that approach not only
the mint, but anyone, even untrusted party, could ver-
ify the quantum banknote without communication with
4the mint. General formulation of the public key quan-
tum money was presented by Aaronson [11] and later it
security was analyzed by Aaronson and Christiano [15].
Following these seminal results many candidates for
the private key quantum money scheme was presented.
The first such scheme, based on stabilizer states, was
proposed by Aaronson [11] but it was later broken by
Lutomirski et al. [13]. There were also some attempts
exploring an idea of local hamiltonians problem that can
also be broken using a single-copy tomography presented
by Farhi et al. [42]. Another idea, based on knot theory,
was proposed by Farhi et al. [16]. It remains unbroken
but there is no full security proof.
Until now more papers concerning the public key quan-
tum money or an analysis of its security was published
that we should point out here [43–45].
In the most recent work, Mark Zhandry [18] proved
that if the injective one-way functions and a indistin-
guishability obfuscator exist, then the scheme of the pub-
lic key quantum money exists. Furthermore he shows
how to adapt the Aaronson and Christiano’s scheme [15]
using these assumptions to get the secure public key
quantum money.
We should also mention an ongoing research on de-
centralized quantum currencies. First Jogenfors [17] pro-
posed Quantum Bitcoin that connects ideas of quantum
money and classical blockchain system like the one used
in Bitcoin. Later Ikeda [19] presented another approach
called qBitcoin based on quantum teleportation and a
quantum chain, instead of the classical blocks. Also a
cryptocurrency called qulogicoin, based on another ver-
sion of the quantum blockchain, was also proposed by
Sun et al. [20]. Recently Adrian Kent proposed a concept
of “S-money” [21] and Daniel Kane created a new money
scheme based on modular forms [22]. Finally Andrea Co-
ladangelo proposed decentralized, blockchain based hy-
brid classical-quantum payment system [46] strengthen-
ing quantum lightning scheme.
III. SEMI-DEVICE INDEPENDENT QUANTUM
MONEY
In this section we first demonstrate simple attacks on
some of the private key quantum money schemes, includ-
ing Wiesner’s and Gavinsky’s ones, which are based on
the cooperation of the mint and the counterfeiter. Next
we discuss why it is impossible to make fully device in-
dependent money scheme in Sec. III B. We then describe
the scheme for semi-device independent quantum money
in Sec III C. Next we compare our money scheme with
the corresponding SDI QKD protocol of Paw lowski and
Brunner, that we use as a base (see Sec. III D). Finally
in Sec. III E we show the idea of the proof, details of
which are presented in the appendices.
A. Simple joined attacks: when the mint and
counterfeiter collaborate
We aim to demonstrate that both the original Wiesner
scheme and that of Gavinsky are vulnerable to the joined
attack. Moreover the attack is general enough to apply
to other private quantum money schemes, as it bases on
dropping important security assumption: the privacy of
the key. Before presenting the attacks we recall how a
honest source prepare the state:∑
(b,v)∈{0,1}2k
1
4k
|b, v〉 〈b, v| honest−−−−→
∑
(b,v)∈{0,1}2k
1
4k
|b, v〉〈b, v| ⊗ |ρW(b,v)〉 〈ρW(b,v)|
(1)
where ρWk ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, the bit-string b tells the
(random) choice of basis, while v corresponds to out-
comes. In the original money only the system W contains
banknote’s state.
Now we are ready to show here three attacks of dif-
ferent types. The first one enlarges the memory of the
banknote, the second one uses additional entanglement
and the third makes it a classical state. The first reduces
to simple imprinting of the secret key of the Bank directly
in banknote’s state. This is at the expense of enlarging
dimension of its quantum memory:∑
(b,v)∈{0,1}2k
1
4k
|b, v〉 〈b, v| attack1−−−−→
∑
(b,v)∈{0,1}2k
1
4k
|b, v〉〈b, v| ⊗ |ρW(b,v)〉 〈ρW(b,v)| ⊗ |b〉 〈b|H
(2)
The mistrustfully prepared banknote has an additional
“hidden” register H enabling the attack. This register
can be used to generate unlimited number of identical
banknotes via repetitive von Neumann measurement of
system W in the basis indicated by vector |b〉〈b|H . Al-
lowing for such a strong attack, one can imagine that in
principle the whole string |b, v〉 could be also imprinted
in money’s memory at a price of doubling it, however
imprinting |b〉 is enough. Operations of copying such a
“banknote” can pass unnoticed from the point of view
of the honest Client. From this trivial example we have
then learned that in the case of an unbounded dimension
of the banknote, its security against forgery is compro-
mised.
The second attack does not require extra memory in
the banknote’s state but makes use of an additional en-
tanglement between adversary and the untrusted source
device. Instead of preparing one from the four honest
states {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} the source performs locally one
from the four Pauli unitaries on a half of a singlet and
sends it as a money state. Later the adversary per-
forms global Bell measurement on whole two qubit sys-
tem. That procedure based on superdense coding [47]
5allows him to obtain both parts of the secret key and
prepare arbitrary number of valid banknotes.
In the third one, the mint and the counterfeiter can
attack jointly without increasing the memory of the ban-
knote and furthermore, without any additional entangle-
ment, by using only classical states (diagonal in a single
basis): ∑
(b,v)∈{0,1}2k
1
4k
|b, v〉〈b, v| attack3−−−−→
∑
(b,v)∈{0,1}2k
1
4k
|b, v〉〈b, v| ⊗ |v〉〈v|H .
(3)
In each run, right before the measurement is physically
done, the measurement device is given the type of basis b
taking value 0 in case of {|0〉, |1〉} and 1 for {|+〉, |−〉}. It
can then safely output the value |v〉〈v|H as a good answer.
The two bits that cannot be encoded in 1 qubit are split
into measurement type (revealed later), and its outcome.
It is important to notice that this attack will not work
in Wiesner’s scheme since there the Bank makes mea-
surement itself, but it will work in some schemes money
schemes with classical verification.
The scheme of money that we propose (see Section
III C) bases on the semi-device independent quantum key
distribution protocol that matches as a partial counter-
measure to these three attacks. In the latter protocol one
assumes that there are only qubits sent, so the first attack
(by enlarging memory) is not applicable. On the other
hand, SDI QKD protocol gets accepted only if the data
coming from quantum states is observed, i.e., that the
systems communicated were not classical bits, disabling
thereby the second attack. This, and the fact that the
honest implementation of the quantum states processed
by the parties in the SDI QKD are Wiesner’s money, mo-
tivates us to study security of Wiesner’s scheme under
the verification of the SDI QKD protocol (as we describe
in detail in Section III C). Before that, in the next sec-
tion, we will present additional result, no-go for Device-
Independent quantum money which highlights the im-
portance of our money scheme.
B. Impossibility of fully device independent
quantum money
In this section we will show that it is impossible to
create a fully device independent money scheme. We
will prove this in a scenario where the Bank has at least
two branches that do not communicate during the ver-
ification phase. In device independent approach both
source and measurement devices are untrusted and there
are no restrictions on state dimension or additional en-
tanglement, opposed to the semi-device independent ap-
proach that we will present in the next sections. On the
other hand, we allow all Bank’s branches to have shared
randomness that can be used both in the state prepa-
ration and verification phases. We also assume that the
no-signaling condition is fulfilled and post processing is
honest, which is the standard approach in most device
independent protocols.
Observation 1 (No-go for device independent quantum
money). It is impossible to create fully device indepen-
dent money scheme with untrusted source and measure-
ment devices that could be produced by adversary.
Intuitively it is easy to see that using an appropriate
modification of the first attack from the previous section
any money scheme can be broken. Indeed, without com-
munication between Bank’s branches, a malicious mint
can always prepare two copies of the banknote in such a
way that both will pass verification in different branches.
The only way a branch can verify the banknote is to
check correlations with client’s banknote. It is impossi-
ble to ensure that the verification will influence, or give
knowledge about, correlations of another branch with dif-
ferent malicious copy of the banknote. To justify these
intuitions we will provide more formal proof of the above
theorem in Appendix D.
Because of the impossibility result we can ask how close
one can go toward the device independent approach. We
partially answer this question by providing in the next
section our main contribution, the semi-device indepen-
dent quantum money scheme. It requires weaker as-
sumptions than any previous one. We prove its security
against a wide class of important attacks and conjecture
that it is also secure in the general case.
C. Semi-device independent quantum money
protocol
Motivated by the fact that joined attacks can com-
promise the security of some private quantum money
schemes we will show a partial solution to this problem.
In this Section we present a scheme for semi-device in-
dependent private key quantum money. The concept of
a semi-device independent quantum key distribution was
discovered by Paw lowski and Brunner [7]. In that scheme
the sender does not have to trust neither the source nor
the measuring device. Instead, the nontrivial assump-
tions are that the states sent to the receiver have limited
dimension and are disentangled from adversary. See Fig-
ure 2.
Our scheme of money will be based on the SDI QKD
scheme with the assumption that the dimension of each
state send from sender to the receiver is a qubit (d = 2).
In order to introduce both the concept and a notation
it is instructive to recap briefly the semi-device inde-
pendent quantum key generation protocol [7]. The key
is produced as follows. The sender sets up n pairs of
random bits (yi0, y
i
1)
n
i=1. In each run of the experiment
i ∈ [n] := {1, . . . , n}, upon pressing the correct button
sender’s device produces an untrusted state ρyi0,yi1 , which
is assumed to be a qubit, and sends it to the receiver. Re-
ceiver’s device is fully untrusted. It measures the state
6FIG. 2. Scheme of the semi-device independent quantum key
distribution [7] (SDI QKD).
in an arbitrary manner (perhaps knowing state’s prepa-
ration), yet upon a (random) input xi it has to output
a bit ai which equals y
i
xi . In the classical case, the suc-
cess probability of guessing the bits of sender is only 3/4,
while in quantum case it is PQ := cos
2(pi/4) ≈ 0.8536.
If the guessing probability is larger than a certain value,
the secure key can be established.
In the SDI quantum money scheme the branches of the
Bank play the roles of senders, while the client Alice is
the receiver.
• Creation of a single banknote. To create the
money all k branches of the Bank have to posses a com-
mon secret randomness that is later stored in classical
memories of the branches. Each portion of the bits
(yi0, y
i
1)
n
i=1 of this key is attached to some serial number
of a separate banknote SN in advance. (Note that the
secret key can be obtained for example by measurement
on the shared 2n GHZ states [48] or by encrypted classi-
cal communication). To generate a quantum state of the
banknote associated to the number SN one branch BS
(in practice the closest to Alice) uses (yi0, y
i
1)
n
i=1 associ-
ated with this SN as a sequence of inputs to its untrusted
device S (source). The latter device in turn generates n
qubits (ρyi0,yi1) that together form the quantum state of
the banknote:
n⊗
i=1
ρyi0,yi1 . (4)
The above state is sent to Alice’s wallet (dedicated quan-
tum memory device). In the end the joined state of k
branches of the Bank and Alice’s wallet takes the form:∑
y=(yi0,y
i
1)∈{0,1}2n
|y〉〈y|B1 ⊗ ...⊗ |y〉〈y|Bk ⊗
(
n⊗
i=1
ρyi0,yi1
)
.
(5)
• Verification at the Bank. Alice comes to any
branch Bl. The Bl generates a bit-string (x
i)ni=1, inputs
the bits to the untrusted terminal T , and collects the
output bit-string (ai)ni=1. For a total data represented
by a string of tuples: SA = (y
i
0, y
i
1, x
i, ai)ni=1 the Bank
accepts it if the following condition is satisfied:
XA(SA) :=
∣∣{i ∈ [n] : ai = yixi}∣∣ ≥ θn (6)
FIG. 3. B1 . . . Bk represents arbitrary number of Bank’s
branches that share common randomness y = (yi0, y
i
1)
n
i=1
stored in the classical memories. Branch BS inputs the string
y into untrusted source device S and sends the generated n
quantum systems ρy =
⊗n
i=1 ρyi0yi1
to Alice’s memory. When
Alice wants to verify the money she visits some branch Bl.
This branch generates random binary string x = (xi)ni=1 of
length n and feeds as an input to untrusted measurement de-
vices of the terminal M = (M i)ni=1, which generates a string
a = (ai)ni=1 . The branch then estimates the probability dis-
tribution P (a|xy) and accepts the banknote as valid or rejects
it dependently on whether the condition Eq (6) is met.
i.e., the number of correct guesses is above the threshold
value θn, and rejects otherwise.
• Verification at a distance. Alice establishes
an authenticated connection for classical communication
with some (arbitrary) branch Bl of the Bank. The Bl
gives her random inputs (xi)ni=1, that she should use to-
gether with her quantum state from the memory of her
wallet as inputs to the untrusted terminal (her own, or,
e.g., the one operated by a seller in a shop). The classical
output (ai)ni=1 from the device (possibly modified by Al-
ice to (a′i)ni=1) is then sent to Bl that checks if the data
(yi0, y
i
1, x
i, a′i)ni=1 are acceptable if inequality (6) holds,
and rejects it otherwise.
For the sake of clarity the whole process of the cre-
ation and the verification of the semi-device independent
quantum money is illustrated in Figure 3 (for the gen-
eral scheme with many branches) and Figure 4 (for the
creation and verification at the same branch). We state
below certain remarks on the variants of the above ap-
proach.
Remark 1 (The creation of the banknote without com-
munication). The branches can create the money without
the communication. Using synchronized clocks, they can
continuously generate new random inputs. When a client
arrive, the serial number of her banknote would contain
time that uniquely indicates what remembered random-
ness verifying branch should use. Additionally branches
should agree among themselves on the allowed genera-
tion time to make sure not to generate two bills from the
same randomness. Similar idea can be also implemented
in some previous money schemes, for example Wiesner’s
one.
Remark 2 (Reusing randomness during a reverifica-
tion). Frederick can adopt a strategy to try verify the
7FIG. 4. The procedure of generation and verification of a
single banknote in the SDI money scheme. The n untrusted
source devices independently produce qubit states ρyi0yi1
that
form in total the banknote that is kept in Alice’s wallet and
is exposed to the counterfeiting by her or Frederick (or even
both). The verification of the banknote is done by n in-
dependent (not necessarily identical) untrusted parts of a
verification terminal, each checking if ai = yi
xi
A
(i.e., if the
its output is equal to one of the two bits of Bank’s note
at run i chosen randomly as xiA). The banknote gets ac-
cepted if the number of correctly guessed bits exceeds βn
with β = 2PQ (1/2 + η) +M (1/2 + η) + 2η, where η depends
on n (taking care of possible fluctuations of the number of
guesses).
same banknote many times, waiting for such a random
string from Bank’s branch. For example he would like to
have the size of set D(x⊕) from the proof (see Appendix
B) as big as possible the size of which would be provid-
ing verification of the banknote. In order to prevent this,
the verifying branch, after the first attempt of the ver-
ification, could store the verification randomness in the
memory and use it in all next tries of the verification of
that banknote.
Remark 3 (Predefined agreement on the queries of the
branches). Instead of using an independent randomness
by all branches during the verification, the branches could
earlier agree on some verification string for all banknotes.
It is possible to do it in similar manner like in the ban-
knote generation procedure. Although it is not necessary
in order to maintain the security, this approach could re-
duce complexity of the proof and decrease a number of the
qubits required in the protocol.
D. Comparison of the SDI QKD and SDI money
scheme
We make now an explicit comparison of our protocol
with that of the semi-device independent of Paw lowski
and Brunner [7]. There are three main differences.
• Memory requirements: A conceptual difference
is that we defer the process of measurement and call the
states prepared by the source in SDI protocol collectively
the banknote. The process of the measurement is iden-
tified by us with the verification done by the terminal
at some later time. It is of particular convenience that
the SDI protocol does not rely on the no-signaling prin-
ciple, so the measurement of the banknotes can be done
any time after they were prepared. In other words, our
protocol needs the quantum memory while SDI does not.
• Limited number of runs: A significant practi-
cal difference is that SDI quantum money scheme corre-
sponds to a limited SDI QKD protocol to the creation
and the verification procedures without the privacy am-
plification and information reconciliation part. In par-
ticular, in our protocol the number of runs of the cor-
responding SDI QKD experiment (i.e., the length of the
banknote) is only long enough to enable estimation of the
guessing probability which depends only on the possible
systematic error in the experiment and the concentration
property due to law of large numbers. This is in contrast
with the SDI QKD protocol which involves as many runs
(at least) as the number of key bits are needed to be gen-
erated. Indeed, we do not aim at creating the secret key,
because - there is no phase of the public reconciliation
and the privacy amplification. Preparing and verifying
long key is equivalent to creating and verifying a huge
number of banknotes.
• An intermediate acceptance threshold: The
third difference concerns the acceptance threshold. Ac-
ceptable range of the value of the probability of guessing
Pguess of the string (y
i
0y
i
1)
n
i=1 in the SDI QKD protocol
varies from the maximal PQ ≈ 0.8536, which implies the
highest possible key rate in this scenario, to the mini-
mal P keycrit ≈ 0.8415, which implies zero key rate. Let us
stress here, that any value between PQ and P
key
crit is ac-
ceptable, as leading to a non-zero key rate (yet, one aims
at the highest). Instead, in the corresponding SDI money
scheme one needs the value of this parameter to be larger
than Pmoneycrit := (PQ + P
key
crit )/2 ≈ 0.84755. On the other
hand, all money schemes with the acceptance threshold
θ in the range (Pmoneycrit , PQ] are protected against forgery
given large enough number of qubits of the banknote n.
E. Security proof of the SDI money scheme
In this section we provide the proof of the main result:
the SDI quantum money scheme is protected against the
qubit-by-qubit forgery. That is, against the case when the
mint and the counterfeiter (as well as the verification ter-
minal possibly created by the counterfeiter) cooperate in
a manner that each qubit is attacked (prepared, copied
and tested) independently. Under some additional neces-
sary assumptions, which we list below, we show that two,
cooperating clients, Alice and Frederick, cannot get the
banknote accepted as valid in two Bank’s branches. As
8we show, the case of many Bank’s branches follows from
the security in the latter case. The case of a birthday at-
tack of choosing best pair of branches is then taken care
of by the union bound. Indeed let us assume that number
of branches equals k = poly(n), where n is the length of
the banknote, which is a reasonable constraint possible
to be satisfied. If for any pair the probability of success-
ful counterfeiting is exponentially small 2(n) ∼ O(e−n),
the highest probability of this event for k branches is not
higher than k :=
(
k
2
)
2(n), which is still small (of order
O(e−n)).
Before we will present the proof, we will first state
explicitly all more or less implicit assumptions of our
scheme. Note, that first two are necessary in general
(not only in the SDI money scheme).
ASM1 Bank’s branches have access to a private fully ran-
dom number generator that they use to generate
y’s and x’s.
ASM2 Branches of the Bank use an honest classical post-
processing units in the verification procedure.
ASM3 The dimension of the state that is produced at
the output of the source (i.e., mint) is bounded
and there is no other information leaking from the
source to Alice or Frederick.
ASM4 The state produced by the source is unentangled
from the dishonest parties (Alice and Frederick).
ASM5 The source devices create the states in independent
way, what also implies that each of the sources have
access only to the its input (not the inputs of the
other sources).
ASM6 The measurement devices are independent, each
measure only its subsystem, and the outputs of Al-
ice and Frederick in each run are independent from
the inputs and the outputs from another runs.
In particular case of the presented SDI money scheme,
in ASM3 we specify that each of the independent parts of
the sources (as specified in ASM5) has output bounded
by d = 2, i.e., the source works by producing indepen-
dently n qubits (however not necessarily in the same
way).
Remark 4 (On the possible weakening of the assump-
tions). It seems plausible that the assumption ASM6
could be omitted but it would complicate the proof. The
question if we can omit the assumption ASM5 is a hard
open problem, related to the formulation of the SDI QKD
scheme and Random Access Codes [49, 50] in general.
On the other hand, all other assumptions are necessary
to prove the security of our scheme since rejecting any of
them leads to a successful attack.
Let us briefly describe the idea of the proof of the se-
curity of the scheme. It is a consequence of two facts: (i)
the monogamy inherent to the SDI key generation pro-
tocol and (ii) the fact that each Bank’s branch queries
independently from the other branches during the ver-
ification procedure. It will hold for the case when the
Bank verifies the banknote via untrusted terminal, i.e.,
Alice (and / or Frederick) come to the Bank to get the
banknote accepted. The case with the communication
is then reduced to the latter, under assumption that the
strategy to lie about the outputs of the devices (which
is then at a choice of the dishonest parties) is individ-
ual, independent for each of the runs of the protocol (see
Appendix A). As we discuss in Section V, this a bit unre-
alistic assumption that can be in principle dropped given
the protocol of SDI QKD is proven to be secure against
the general, so called forward signaling attacks.
1. The case of attack on a single qubit
By definition, much like in the Wiesner scheme, for
a banknote to be accepted, its owner has to guess cor-
rectly the bits of the Bank. To see that two dishonest
persons, Alice and Frederick, can not both pass the ver-
ification of our banknote it is instructive to focus on the
attack on a single qubit of the banknote. Suppose Alice
and Frederick are trying to “split” its use to maximize
the probability of guessing Pguess in two experiments of
some two branches of the Bank. Their joined attack can
be described as a conditional probability distribution (a
box): P (aF , aA|xA, xF , y0, y1), where y0 and y1 are the
secret keys of the Bank which Alice and Frederick are
trying to guess, xA and xB are the random inputs to the
box generated by the Bank.
For simplicity of description we will assume that Alice
and Frederick comes to the Bank, while the Bank who
sets the input to the devices (we will argue later how
to partially relax this assumption). The joined attack
aims at generating two bits aA (by Alice) and aF (by
Frederick), such that the probability of guessing the xAth
bit of yB = (y0, y1) and xF th bit of yB by Frederick are
both maximal. The guessing probability for Alice and
Frederick respectively read:
PAguess =
1
8
∑
y0,y1,xA
P (aA = yxA |y0, y1, xA), (7)
and
PFguess =
1
8
∑
y0,y1,xF
P (aF = yxF |y0, y1, xF ). (8)
Let us observe first that in the case xA = xF , they can
both achieve the maximal possible probability of guess-
ing PQ = cos
2(pi/8) ≈ 0.8536 [7]. Indeed, Alice can come
first to one branch, and behave honestly having the guess-
ing probability PAguess = PQ, while Frederick can copy her
answer, reaching the same probability of guessing. How-
ever, when xA 6= xF = xA⊕1, the dishonest parties need
to guess opposite bits: y0 (Alice) and y1 (Frederick) or
vice versa (with half probability). However, it is proven
9in [7] that
PAFguess(y0) + P
AF
guess(y1) ≤
5 +
√
3
4
=: M. (9)
Hence, even if Alice and Frederick were fully collaborat-
ing, the sum of the probabilities of guessing of the two
bits is bounded.
Since xA = xF with the probability one half, averaging
over the value of xA ⊕ xF we conclude that the average
number of correctly guessed bits has an upper bound
1
2
(2PQ +M) := B. (10)
In what follows we will prove that due to the indepen-
dent nature of the attack, the above bound, multiplied
by the number of runs n, applies (up to fluctuations η
around the average). The corresponding bound enlarged
by the maximal possible fluctuations reads then nβ with
β = 2PQ (1/2 + η) + M (1/2 + η) + 2η. We will then
choose the threshold value θ to be larger than β/2. This
will assure, that the two dishonest parties can not get the
same banknote accepted in two Bank’s branches, as their
total sum of the guesses would be larger than 2β/2 = β,
reaching the desired contradiction.
2. Extending the argument to the general case of the
qubit-by-qubit attack
We would like to extend this reasoning to the case of
the repeated experiment of n runs (n will be relatively
small, as short as the length of an usual preamble of
the QKD protocols). We assume here that the attack is
“id”, i.e., by not necessarily equal however independently
distributed random variables, according to the measure:
µ ∼
n⊗
i=1
U
(
yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, x
i
F
)
P
(
aiA, a
i
F |yi0, yi1, xiA, xiF
)
,
(11)
where U(yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, x
i
F ) denotes the uniform distribution
over its arguments. We then observe that, instead of pro-
viding xA to Alice and xF to Frederick, the two branches
of the Bank could give xA to Alice and x⊕ := xA⊕xF to
Frederick. This is because Alice and Frederick are collab-
orating, so they can compute back value of xF from these
data in case it is needed. We can therefore change the
scenario to one in which the parties are given (xA, x⊕),
if the probability measure is changed accordingly to the
following one:
µ′ ∼
n⊗
i=1
U
(
yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, x
i
⊕ ⊕ xiA
)
× P (aiA, aiF |yi0, yi1, xiA, xi⊕ ⊕ xiA) .
(12)
The measure µ′ acts on xA and x⊕ in the same way as µ
would acts on xA and xF , so in some sense it is undoing
the XOR operation. This modification of scenario does
not change the probability of successful forgery, i.e., the
probability of an event in which both Alice will get ac-
cepted as supposed to have a valid banknote and so will
happen to Frederick. To see this, we first note that a set
of events (denoted as F) leading to a successful forgery
reads:
F := {(yi0, yi1, xiA, aiA, xiF , aiF )ni=1 ∈ {0, 1}6n :∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiA = yixiA}∣∣∣ > θn,∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixiF}∣∣∣ > θn} .
(13)
We will also define a strategy S by
S := (yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
F , a
i
F )
n
i=1. (14)
We then prove (see Corollary 1) that
P (F) :=
∑
S∈F
P∼µ(F)
=
∑
S′∈F ′
P∼µ′P (S′)
=:P (F ′),
(15)
where S′ = (yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
⊕, a
i
F )
n
i=1 and
F ′ := {(yi0, yi1, xiA, aiA, xi⊕, aiF )ni=1 ∈ {0, 1}6n :∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiA = yixiA}∣∣∣ > θn,∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixi⊕⊕xAi }∣∣∣ > θn} .
(16)
Due to the fact that x⊕ is created from fully random
bits that are unknown for adversary during creation of
the money, we have
P (F ′) =
∑
x⊕∈{0,1}n
p(x⊕)P (F ′|x⊕). (17)
We can narrow considerations to the typical x⊕, i.e.,
those having number of symbol 0 and 1 approximately
n/2 times. More formally the set of typical sequences is
defined as
Tη :=
{
x :
∣∣∣∣ |x|0n − 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η} , (18)
where |x|0 is the number of positions with symbol 0 in
a bitstring x. All sequences of the length n (given n is
large enough) are with high probability typical (i.e., with
a probability 1− (η) for (η) = 2 exp(−2η2n)). We have
therefore
P (F ′) ≤
∑
x⊕∈T (η)
p(x⊕)P (F ′|x⊕) + (η). (19)
We then see that one can fix a typical x⊕, and prove
that for any such x⊕ the probability of acceptance is low.
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We will assure it by setting an appropriate θ, so that with
a high probability over the conditional measure µ′′ :=
µ′(x⊕)/p(x⊕) the strings S′ emerging from the attack
will be rejected as having too low number of guessed bits
of (yi0, y
i
1)
n
i=1.
In more detail, we first note that for a fixed x⊕, on av-
erage over n runs with respect to the measure µ′′, there
are no more guessed inputs than nB with B given in Eq.
(10). It remains to take into account the fact, that the ob-
served number of the guessed inputs need not to be equal
to its average. However x⊕ is typical, hence the number
of runs will be at least n/2− ηn, so we can use that the
attack is performed in the independent manner. Due to
Hoeffding’s inequality, we obtain that the observed num-
ber of guessed inputs is with a high probability bounded
from above by:
nβ ≡n
[
(2PQ
(
1
2
+ η
)
+M
(
1
2
+ η
)
+ 2η
]
=n
[(
2 cos
(pi
8
)
+
5 +
√
3
4
)(
1
2
+ η
)
+ 2η
] (20)
where η takes care of the maximal possible fluctuations.
Before we explicitly control these fluctuations, we first
define four random variables describing the guessing at
the ith run of the verification procedure by Alice and
Frederick as
X
x⊕
i,A :=
{
δ
(
aiA, y
i
xiA
)
: xiA = x
i
F
0 : xiA 6= xiF
, (21)
X
x⊕
i,F :=
{
δ
(
aiF , y
i
xiA
)
: xiA = x
i
F
0 : xiA 6= xiF
, (22)
Y
x⊕
i,A :=
{
δ
(
aiA, y
i
xiA
)
: xiA 6= xiF
0 : xiA = x
i
F
, (23)
Y
x⊕
i,F :=
{
δ
(
aiF , y
i
xiA⊕1
)
: xiA 6= xiF
0 : xiA = x
i
F
. (24)
Now we can get back to describing deviations from the
average of the 4 random variables: X¯Ax⊕ , X¯
F
x⊕ , Y¯
A
x⊕ and
Y¯ Fx⊕ that are the sums over i ∈ [n] for the variables de-
scribed above. The values of X¯Ax⊕(X¯
F
x⊕) are the numbers
of bits of (yi0, y
i
1) correctly guessed by Alice (Frederick)
from the positions i satisfying xiA 6= xiF . Analogously,
Y¯ Ax⊕(Y¯
F
x⊕) describe the number of correct guesses for i
such that xiA = x
i
F . Details are given in Lemma 2 and
Corollary 2 (see also Appendix B for an explicit definition
of random variables, their sum and expected values).
The last argument follows from a simple observation.
Namely, if the total fraction of the correctly guessed po-
sitions by two persons is less than β, the minimum of the
fractions of the correct guesses by each of them separately
is not greater than β/2. Setting the acceptance thresh-
old θ large enough that the minimum of the numbers of
guesses is below θ, we assure that for each typical x⊕ the
banknote is rejected with the high probability in at least
one branch. In particular, for any θ > β/2 this probabil-
ity is at least 1 − 8 exp(−η2(n/2 − η)), where for every
typical x⊕ the error 8 exp(−η2(n/2 − η)) upper bounds
the probability of event that at least one of the 4 random
variables X¯Ax⊕ , X¯
F
x⊕ , Y¯
A
x⊕ , Y¯
F
x⊕ is far from its respective
average.
Taking into account Eqs (19) and (15), we obtain fi-
nally
P (F) ≤ 5′(η), (25)
with ′(η) := 2 exp(−η2(n/2− η)).
IV. QUANTUM
ORESME-COPERNICUS-GRESHAM’S LAW
One of the famous laws of economy is:
• Bad money drives out good.
This law states, colloquially speaking, that if certain
money is cheaper to produce, then it will eventually sub-
side the one that is more expensive to produce, where
expensive is understood not in terms of face value but
in terms of intrinsic value. Although it was named after
Sir Gresham, it has been observed by others, even much
earlier. The two most cited authors are Nicole Oresme
[26] and Nicolaus Copernicus [27], so that the above
law is also refereed to as Copernicus’, or the Oresme-
Copernicus-Gresham’s Law. However, the first known
appearance of a similar statement is in the comedy “The
Frogs”, written by the Ancient Greek playwright Aristo-
phanes around 405 BC [25]. For a overview of the law
see e.g. [24].
From the perspective of the economy the concept of
money is a matter of a social agreement and properties
of a given material/procedure used to produce a coin or
a banknote. So it might appear that there is no need
to consider a quantum variant of Gresham’s law per se,
because one can apply the OCG Law to the new method
of mining – from quantum states. This is what hap-
pens to classical crypto-currencies. Instead, formulating
quantum analog of the OCG Law we would like to com-
pare quantum currencies with each other within quantum
domain. This is because one could choose a “cheaper”
way to produce money – from quantum states that are
“cheaper” to obtain whatever means “cheaper” to quan-
tum technology at a given moment of development. We
therefore would like to introduce and discuss a version of
Quantum Gresham’s law in the following way:
• Bad quantum money drives out good quan-
tum one.
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Deciding whether to keep a given quantum currency
or not may be a complex process, depending on various
mutually dependent parameters, the importance of which
varies over a change of preferences of particular individ-
uals or societies. It is therefore too early and hence too
hard to foresee the behavior of the quantum currency
flow between the schemes provided they happen to be
realized experimentally.
Example 1. For the presented SDI quantum money
scheme, to be unforgeable via qubit-by-qubit way, it is
enough that the source of the banknote (if it able to pro-
duce a large number of banknotes) manages to produce
SDI key at a rate θ > β/2. It is however not demanded
that θ ≈ PQ, i.e., that the source would be able to pro-
duce money equivalent to low number of runs of the SDI
key generation experiment with the maximal possible rate
PQ.
Suppose that some provider PI is able to produce the
SDI money which passes the acceptance threshold θ =
β/2 + 2δ for some δ > 0. Next, suppose that some
other provider PII is be able to produce a reliable SDI
money with the lower acceptance threshold β/2 + δ. As
we have proved in Theorem 1, banknotes of both providers
are valid and can not be forged under certain assump-
tions. However the banknote of the provider PI can be
attributed a larger quantum commodity value defined as
the SDI key rate of a source which produced the banknote.
From perspective of banknote’s holder, this key rate im-
plies nonzero rate of the min-entropy of banknote’s quan-
tum state and hence nonzero rate of the private random-
ness. An additional reason to keep the PI type money
and spend more often PII type is that the first one could
be more robust to noise. Indeed, even decrease by δ of the
observed fraction of the correct guesses will not invalidate
the banknote.
We make then the following observation:
Observation 2. If the Quantum Oresme-Copernicus-
Gresham law applies, the SDI money with lower accep-
tance threshold θ would drive out the SDI money with
higher θ. (We note here, that we have implicitly as-
sumed that the hardware parameters of the realization
by PI and PII are comparable. Otherwise, realization of
the banknote according to type PII ’ receipt can be simply
too expensive, e.g. in energy spent on keeping them in a
quantum wallet).
The above example is very limited, as it concerns differ-
ent ways of realization of the same money scheme (i.e.,
currency). It is however plausible that if the quantum
version of the OCG law turns out to be true, the indi-
viduals will tend to keep the most secure, cheapest to
produce and to store money of the highest commodity
value (in the sense of its use for quantum information pro-
cessing), and will spend the other currencies more often.
Going a bit further, one can consider monies in theory
T (for such a general approach see [23]), and have a “T
Oresme-Copernicus-Gresham Law”, a theory-dependent
version describing flow of currencies valid in a theory T .
An interesting special case would be the “multi-theory
OCG Law” that could govern the flow of currencies be-
tween different sub-theories. A natural example of the
latter would be Classical-Quantum Oresme-Copernicus-
Gresham Law, expressing the behavior of everyday cur-
rencies and the quantum ones on the same footing.
A. A comparison of the money schemes
In the Table I we present the comparison of different
protocols, including original protocol of Stephen Wiesner
[1] and that of Dimitry Gavinsky [6], and show which
(parameters of) quantum devices have to be trusted by
the Bank in order to maintain security.
B. How close we are to practice?
A fundamental obstacle in realization of the presented
one and many other money schemes is the fact that it re-
lies on existence of a reliable and long-time living quan-
tum memory. It is hard to foresee when (if ever) such
memories would be available, however there are works
towards this direction. As an example of a recent huge
experimental progress in developing the quantum mem-
ory we can invoke paper by Wang et al. [51], presenting
a single-qubit quantum memory that exceeds coherence
time of ten minutes. Furthermore Harper and Flammia
[52] demonstrated the first implementation of the error
correcting codes on a real quantum computer. This may
indicate, that the error correcting codes can become use-
ful in the near future quantum memories.
We want to emphasize here that the tasks of univer-
sal fault-tolerant quantum computing [53] and of a reli-
able quantum repeater [54] (for latest discovery see [55]
and references therein) are both different from that of a
fault-tolerant quantum storage (QS). The memory of the
quantum computer need not be stable for a long time,
because it is needed only for the time when the gates
of quantum algorithm are done, while the QS needs to
be stable for a long period of time. However, operations
on the QS are far from being universal [56], reduced to
measurements in two bases (at least in the considered
SDI money scheme). In that respect the QS appears
to have much easier functionality. The easiness of op-
erations of the QS is more comparable with that of the
single quantum repeater station (at least for the 1st gen-
eration quantum repeater [57]). However the 1st genera-
tion single repeater’s node needs to achieve the operation
of entanglement swapping of two photons incoming from
different origins, which is a totally different task. In the
case of the QS states are prepared and need not be send,
i.e., QS can be done without the use of photons. This
should simplify this task in comparison to the task of
achieving quantum Internet. (Note also that a station
of the 3rd generation quantum repeater is close in per-
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Protocol Classical scheme Wiesner’s scheme[1] Gavinsky’s scheme[6] SDI[this work] DI[this work]
Source Yes Yes Yes No No
Alice’s measurement N/A Yes1 No No No
System dimension No No No Yes No
Number of branches 1 unlimited unlimited unlimited unlimited
TABLE I. Table of the Bank’s trust. 1 The measurement of Alice’s subsystem can be performed in Bank’s branch or in the
partially trusted terminal (for example, in a shop).
formance to the small-size universal quantum computer
[57]).
However, although there is no physical law that bounds
from above the time of coherence of a qubit state, achiev-
ing a reliable QS appears to be an extremely hard task,
because of quantum decoherence, that is usually happen-
ing very fast. This is the reason why the very first idea
(of QS needed for money schemes) appearing in the the-
ory may become the last one (after quantum computer
and quantum Internet) to be realized in practice. This
may also happen due to the fact, that, in contrast to
quantum computing or quantum secure communication,
money scheme requires to be widespread implemented in
order to be useful.
It is also worth to notice that, recently, the first experi-
mental implementation of quantum money schemes were
performed [36–38]. It indicates that real life implemen-
tation of quantum money could potentially be achievable
using the near future technologies.
V. DISCUSSION
In this article we have presented an alternative method
of testing of the original Wiesner banknotes - a Semi-
Device Independent quantum money scheme. To our
knowledge this is the first attempt to provide the pri-
vate money scheme unforgeability of which would not
fully relay on trusting the mint (source of the banknote)
and the inner workings of the verifying terminal at the
same time.
Furthermore we provide impossibility result for a fully
device independent quantum money. It shows that our
Semi-Device Independent approach is a good candidate
for the strongest possible money scheme. To clarify, by
the strongest we mean here that we maximally reduce
trust to inner working of all quantum devices that are
used in all stages of money production and verification.
We have proven that the scheme cannot be broken by
a forgery who copies the banknote in a qubit-by-qubit
manner in the scenario when the banknote is returned
to the Bank for verification, provided the banknote was
created in a qubit-by-qubit manner (each qubit created
independently). The scheme remains secure in a case of
verification by the classical communication at a distance,
upon the assumption that the counterfeiter lies about the
outputs in the independent manner during the verifica-
tion procedure.
We have thereby also made an explicit connection
of the money schemes with the idea of a private key
which is not classical, but from the other theory (gen-
eralized probability theory), exploring thereby directions
presented in [6, 23].
It is plausible that the proposed scheme inherits the
security of the underlying, in our case the original semi-
device independent quantum key distribution protocol.
Given the full proof of security of the SDI QKD against
a forward signaling adversary, as it is the case for the DI
QKD [58] (see [59] for the latest breakthrough), it may
follow that our suitably modified scheme is fully unforge-
able. The sufficient modification concerns the communi-
cation in verification procedure. The counterfeiter would
need to give the answer(s) (aiA, a
i
F ) after getting inputs
(xiA, x
i
F ), but before learning next inputs (x
i+1
A , x
i+1
F ).
In such a case each possible history-dependent lie can
be treated safely as a part of the attack of the device,
and hence would not affect the model. The rest of the
proof would follow from similar arguments as above with
a proper use of the concentration of martingales. It is
therefore important to verify if the SDI protocol is fully
secure. An intermediate step would be to extend the
security proof the presented SDI money scheme to its
variant given in [60], prove there to be secure against
collective attacks.
One might think that we could have used directly the
scheme of the device dependent key secure against the
quantum adversary [58], avoiding thereby unnatural as-
sumption about altering outputs by the terminal in an
independent manner during verification procedure. It is
indeed straightforward to extend the idea presented here
for a single Bank’s branch with much weaker assump-
tions. However it needs suitable modifications leading
to novel scheme(s), in order to be extended to the case
with multiple Bank’s branches. This approach therefore
results in a scheme fundamentally different from the orig-
inal one and its follow-ups like the presented SDI money
scheme.
We have compared the SDI money scheme with the
protocol of the SDI QKD, showing that they differ in
three ways. Firstly, the money scheme requires a reliable
quantum memory, while the SDI QKD does not. Most of
quantum money schemes suffer from this problem, i.e.,
it is not a special property of our scheme (however, see
the recent proposal by A. Kent [21]). Secondly, in princi-
ple, the money scheme does not need the number of runs
of the experiment, as producing the key is out of focus,
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conversely to the goal of the SDI QKD protocol. How-
ever, the presented SDI scheme based on qubits leads to
the banknotes of the significant quantum memory (as we
exemplify in Section F), because number of qubits n has
to diminish the effect of fluctuations η. Fortunately, our
security proof seems to be straightforwardly adaptable to
the SDI schemes based on the SDI QKD protocol with
more than two inputs on Bank’s side and (if needed) the
dimension of the system [49, 50]. Considering such an ex-
tension would be of high importance for more practical
examples. Thirdly, our money scheme needs a moderate
error tolerance, roughly speaking just little above the one
implying one half of the possible key rate achievable in
the corresponding SDI scheme. This, in principle opens
an area for the robustness of the money scheme against
noise. Given the banknotes are initially prepared at high
quality, it can drop, significantly yet without compromis-
ing security against forgery, to the value corresponding
to about half of the maximal possible key rate of the SDI
protocol.
Given a more promising for practical realization vari-
ant of this scheme exists, one should consider its robust
version, that can be realized in laboratory including all
side effects, that may potentially open it for the attacks
of hackers. This aspect of the SDI QKD has been recently
studied in [60–63].
Another important direction of development would be
checking if the proposed scheme could be treated as an
option for a user of the original Wiesner scheme or its
other extensions like Gavinsky’s protocol. The resulting
scheme would give higher protection against malicious
money provider, matching the best of two approaches.
In the presented scheme, the banknotes (even in case of
the honest client Alice) are inevitably lost during their
verification. It seems natural then (like it is done by
Gavinsky [6]) to extend our scheme to the case of the
transactions which we also defer to the future work.
Finally, in a bit speculative way, we have put forward
a hypothesis called the Quantum Oresme-Copersnicus-
Gresham Law : an analogue of the classical law of the
economy also known as Gresham’s Law. This law states
that the bad money (with lower intrinsic value) drives out
the good one (with higher intrinsic value), as the latter is
less often spend. We have exemplified this law on the ba-
sis of different realizations of the SDI money scheme, cor-
responding to the different values of the threshold leading
to the acceptance of money. These speculations need fur-
ther, more formal, exploration with examples based on
more types of currencies, as well as an extension (what
appears to be straightforward) to the case of resources
within the paradigm of [64].
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Appendix A: Preliminary definitions
We will start by defining two crucial constants M and PQ, which come from [7],
M :=
5 +
√
3
4
, PQ := cos
2
(pi
8
)
. (A1)
It is easy to see that PQ > M/2.
Lets us now define notation used in the rest of the paper. By y’s we denote the inputs used by the Bank in
order to create the money, x’s stand for the questions that the branches verifying Alice and Frederick ask them, x˜
represents real value that Alice and Frederick input into the devices, and we use a’s for Alice’s and Frederick’s outputs.
Furthermore, i in an upper index denotes the i-th run of the protocol that acts on the i-th quantum subsystem. The
general attack performed in the qubit-by-qubit manner (See Assumptions ASM5 and ASM6) can be described by a
probability measure on the data used in the verification protocol. Part of the data are generated by the Bank (inputs
to the verification procedure) while the outputs aA and aF are generated by the Alice and Frederick according to
their choice of the conditional distribution. The total joint distribution of the inputs and outputs reads
n⊗
i=1
P (yi0,BA , y
i
0,BF , y
i
1,BA , y
i
1,BF , x
i
A, x
i
F , x˜
i
A, x˜
i
F )P
(
aiA, a
i
F |yi0,BA , yi0,BF , yi1,BA , yi1,BF , xiA, xiF , x˜iA, x˜iF
)
. (A2)
In what follows we will simplify it due to certain assumptions. We know, from the definition of money generating
protocol, that if Frederick wants to verify the same banknote as Alice, then y’s are the same for all branches, so we
can omit variables for each branch and write just yi0 and y
i
1. Furthermore, if Bank’s branches input appropriate bits
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to the devices themselves, than we are sure that xiA = x˜
i
A and x
i
F = x˜
i
F , obtaining
n⊗
i=1
P
(
yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, x
i
F
)
P
(
aiA, a
i
F |yi0, yi1, xiA, xiF
)
. (A3)
Observation 3. Our scheme remains secure if we allow Alice and Frederick to set device inputs, under assumption
that they do it in an independent way in each run. Any run-independent cheating strategy of Alice or Frederick based
on using inputs x˜iA, x˜
i
F different from x
i
A, x
i
F provided by the Bank can be incorporated into inner working of the
untrusted devices and we can also omit it.
Since we assume that y’s and x’s generated by Bank are fully random, what is possible due to Assumption ASM1,
we can rewrite the above formula as
µ ∼
n⊗
i=1
U
(
yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, x
i
F
)
P
(
aiA, a
i
F |yi0, yi1, xiA, xiF
)
, (A4)
where U , here and in all measures defined later, stands for the uniform distribution over appropriate variables.
Now we can define the set describing successful forgery, meaning that both Alice and Frederick are accepted using
the same banknote.
F :=
{
(yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
F , a
i
F )
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}6n :
∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiA = yixiA}∣∣∣ > θn, ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixiF}∣∣∣ > θn} , (A5)
S := (yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
F , a
i
F )
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}6n. (A6)
We also define sequences
Si := (yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
F , a
i
F ). (A7)
Now we can make the following observation that is an easy consequence of the security proof of [7]. It is important
to notice that we need here Assumptions ASM1, ASM2, ASM3, and ASM4 since there are also necessary in [7]
For clarity, we change notation by substituting B and E by A and F , respectively.
Observation 4.
PAF (a0) + PAF (a1) ≤M. (A8)
Proof. From Eq. (12) of [7] and the comment that follows the equation we know that
PAF (a0) + PAF (a1) + PAF (a0 ⊕ a1) ≤ 3
2
(
1 +
1√
3
)
. (A9)
Using Eq. (13) of [7],
PAF (a0) + PAF (a1)− 1 ≤ PAF (a0 ⊕ a1), (A10)
we obtain
PAF (a0) + PAF (a1) ≤ 1
2
(
3
2
(
1 +
1√
3
)
+ 1
)
=
5 +
√
3
4
. (A11)
The right side is equal to M , which completes the proof.
Appendix B: Main lemmas
We will use numerously the concentration property of a distribution of independently distributed n random variables
on [0, 1] due to Hoeffding, of the form
P (|X¯ −EX¯| ≥ η) ≤ 2e−2nη2 . (B1)
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where X¯ = (1/n)
∑
iXi.
For a bitstring x of length n we will denote by |x|0 the number of occurrences of symbol 0 in x (analogously |x|1
will denote the number of 1s in x). Thus,
P
(∣∣∣∣ |x|0n − 12
∣∣∣∣ ≥ η) ≤ 2e−2η2n, (B2)
where η ≥ 0. Due to the above concentration, probability mass function is concentrated on the so-called η-typical
sequences, defined as the values of x satisfying ||x|0/n− 1/2| ≤ η. In other words, for a set
Tn,η :=
{
x :
∣∣∣∣ |x|0n − 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ η} , (B3)
there is,
P∼U(x)(x ∈ Tn,η) ≥ 1− 2e−2η
2n (B4)
where the probability is taken from a uniform distribution U(x) of sequences x := (xi)ni=1 over {0, 1}n. In particular,
for two sequences xA and xF drawn independently at random from {0, 1}n,
P (xA ⊕ xF ∈ Tn,η) ≥ 1− 2e−2η2n, (B5)
where by ⊕ we mean the bit-wise XOR operation on the bits of xA and xF . Indeed, for any fixed xA the distribution
of xF ⊕ xA is uniform if such was that of xF . We can use then the typicality argument and average over p(xA).
At the expense of small error one can deal only with such as S that have η-typical inputs xA and xF . Such S will
be called η-typical :
S ≡ (yi0, yi1, xiA, aiA, xiF , aiF )ni=1 is called η-typical iff xA ⊕ xF ≡ (xiA ⊕ xiF )ni=1 ∈ Tn,η. (B6)
The set of η-typical S will be denoted as T (η).
In what follows we will show that the probability of acceptance of a banknote twice, i.e., P (F), is equal to the
probability accepting it twice in a different scenario (the XOR scenario). In the latter Alice gets xA while Frederick
is given xA ⊕ xF . In spite of the fact that it will not be the case in real life, this transformation of the scenario (and
the corresponding probability measure) will simplify our considerations.
The XOR scenario is obtained from the original one by the following map on the events S:
S = (yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
F , a
i
F )
n
i=1 7→pi S′ := (yi0, yi1, xiA, aiA, xiF ⊕ xiA, aiF )ni=1. (B7)
We will refer to the transformed event as the one having xi⊕ on the position where x
i
F is in S:
S′ := (yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
⊕, a
i
F )
n
i=1. (B8)
We define the set of all forged S′ in a way analogous to the definition of the set F :
F ′ :=
{
(yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
⊕, a
i
F )
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}6n :
∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiA = yixiA}∣∣∣ > θn, ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixi⊕⊕xiA}∣∣∣ > θn} . (B9)
A new probability measure µ′ defined on the set of events S′ is defined as
µ′ ∼
n⊗
i=1
U
(
yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, x
i
⊕ ⊕ xiA
)
P
(
aiA, a
i
F |yi0, yi1, xiA, xi⊕ ⊕ xiA
)
. (B10)
Observation 5. The map pi:
1. is bijective and involutive,
2. satisfies S ∈ F ⇔ S′ ∈ F ′,
3. satisfies µ′(S′) = µ(S).
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Proof. The bijectivity follows directly from the fact that (xA, xF ) is bijectively mapped to (xA, xA ⊕ xF ). The first
input is preserved, while the second one can be reconstructed uniquely by XORing inputs. It is also easy to see that
pi is an involution, since (xA, xA ⊕ xF ) is mapped back to (xA, xF ).
We show now the Property 2. Let S ∈ F . This happens if and only if∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiA = yixiA}∣∣∣ > θn and ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixiF}∣∣∣ > θn. (B11)
The event S′ equals (yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
⊕, a
i
F )
n
i=1. By definition of F ′, we have that S′ ∈ F ′ if and only if∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiA = yixiA}∣∣∣ > θn and ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixi⊕⊕xiA}∣∣∣ > θn. (B12)
Since the left conditions are identical, we only have to prove equality on the right conditions. By definition of a map
pi−1, we obtain ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixi⊕⊕xiA}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yi(xiA⊕xiF )⊕xiA}∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixiF}∣∣∣ , (B13)
what proves an appropriate equality and implies that S ∈ F ⇔ S′ ∈ F ′.
Finally, we argue that the Property 3 also holds. Let us fix arbitrary S. Hence, xi⊕ = x
i
A ⊕ xiF in definition of S′,
and
µ′(S′) =
n⊗
i=1
U
(
yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, x
i
⊕ ⊕ xiA
)
P
(
aiA, a
i
F |yi0, yi1, xiA, xi⊕ ⊕ xiA
)
pi−1
=
n⊗
i=1
U
(
yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, (x
i
F ⊕ xiA)⊕ xiA
)
P
(
aiA, a
i
F |yi0, yi1, xiA, (xiF ⊕ xiA)⊕ xiA
)
=
n⊗
i=1
U
(
yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, x
i
F
)
P
(
aiA, a
i
F |yi0, yi1, xiA, xiF
)
= µ(S),
(B14)
where pi−1 above denotes that equality follows from the properties of the inverse of map pi, which due to involution
property is equal to pi .
Alice, as before, gets bit xiA, but Frederick obtains XOR of bits x
i
A and x
i
F . Despite this, “original” box, due to
“wirings”, receives xiA and x
i
F . We have then an important corollary, that we can focus now on the XOR scenario
because the probability of forgery in the latter equals to the probability of forgery in the former.
Corollary 1.
P∼µ(F) = P∼µ′(F ′). (B15)
One can focus on the typical sequences S, i.e., those for which x⊕ ∈ T (η), at the expense of exponentially small
inaccuracy in estimating the probability of forgery due to measure µ′.
Lemma 1.
P (F ′) ≤ P (F ′ ∩ T (η)) + (η), (B16)
with (η) = 2 exp(−2η2n).
Proof. With a little abuse of notation we will mean by (y0, y1, xA, aA, x⊕, aF ) the properly ordered sequence of tuples
(yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
⊕, a
i
F )
n
i=1, where y0 = (y
i
0)
n
i=1, and by analogy the same for other symbols.
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We will show first a sequence of (in)equalities:
P (F ′) =
∑
S′∈F ′
P∼µ′(S′)
=
∑
S′∈F ′∩T (η)
P∼µ′(S′) +
∑
S′∈F ′\T (η)
P∼µ′(S′)
=
∑
xA,x⊕,y0,y1⊂S′:S′∈F ′∩T (η)
u(xA)u(x⊕)u(y0)u(y1)P (aA, aF |y0, y1, xA, x⊕ ⊕ xA)
+
∑
xA,x⊕,y0,y1⊂S′:S′∈F ′\T (η)
u(xA)u(x⊕)u(y0)u(y1)P (aA, aF |y0, y1, xA, x⊕ ⊕ xA)
≤
∑
xA,x⊕,y0,y1⊂S′:S′∈F ′∩T (η)
u(xA)u(x⊕)u(y0)u(y1)P (aA, aF |y0, y1, xA, x⊕ ⊕ xA)
+
∑
xA,x⊕,y0,y1:(x⊕)∈T (η)
u(xA)u(x⊕)u(y0)u(y1)
≤P (F ′ ∩ T (η)) + (η).
(B17)
We have used the fact that the distribution of x⊕ is the same (uniform) irrespectively of a particular attack. This is
because the distributions of xA and xF with respect to the measure µ are uniform and independent from the attack,
as being prior to the attack, while x⊕ has distribution of xA ⊕ xF according to the definition of a measure µ′. In the
last inequality we have used typicality argument from Eq. (B5).
Due to random nature of variable x⊕,
P (F ′ ∩ T (η)) =
∑
x⊕∈T (η)
P (x⊕)P (F ′|x⊕). (B18)
The advantage of the measure µ′ is that we can easily divide the set of each run i according to the values of the xi⊕.
Technical as it sounds, it will simplify the argument. In the runs where xi⊕ = 0, the best strategy achieves quantum
value PQ for both Alice and Frederick. However, for x⊕ = 1 they are in a position of Alice guessing the opposite bit
to the one which Frederick is at the same time in this run i to guess. Hence, they are limited as it is shown in the
original paper by Paw lowski and Brunner [7].
From now on, we will fix x⊕ := (xi⊕)
n
i=1 and prove a common bound on guessing for all of its typical values. We
can then define new conditional measure µ′′ that depends on x⊕ as
µ′′ := µ|x˜⊕ = δ(x˜⊕,x⊕)
n⊗
i=1
u(xiA)u(y
i
0)u(y
i
1)P
i(aiF , a
i
A|xiA, xi⊕ ⊕ xiA, yi0, yi1). (B19)
We will now show that, on average, the forgeries Alice and Frederick have total number of correctly guessed bits of
y0, y1 bit-strings bounded from above by certain value. Let us first define the set of indexes
D(x⊕) := {i ∈ [n] : xi⊕ = 0}, (B20)
and its complement D¯(x⊕). It is important to notice that, for runs in the set D(x⊕), Alice and Frederick will be
asked about the same Bank’s bit and in the case of D¯(x⊕) they will have to guess two different bits of the Bank.
Then we can consider four types or random variables defined on Ωi, each depending on the value of the x⊕. It is
important to notice that these variables describe the probabilities of guessing appropriate bits in ith run, by Alice
and Frederick respectively and furthermore have strong connection with the definition of F .
X
x⊕
i,A :=
{
δ
(
aiA, y
i
xiA
)
: i ∈ D(x⊕)
0 : i ∈ D¯(x⊕)
, X
x⊕
i,F :=
{
δ
(
aiF , y
i
xiA
)
: i ∈ D(x⊕)
0 : i ∈ D¯(x⊕)
, (B21)
Y
x⊕
i,A :=
{
δ
(
aiA, y
i
xiA
)
: i ∈ D¯(x⊕)
0 : i ∈ D(x⊕)
, Y
x⊕
i,F :=
{
δ
(
aiF , y
i
xiA⊕1
)
: i ∈ D¯(x⊕)
0 : i ∈ D(x⊕)
, (B22)
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where the sample space is defined as
Ωix⊕ := {S′i : xi⊕(S′i) = xi⊕}, (B23)
while xi⊕(S
′i) denotes taking a variable with a label xi⊕ from the sequence S
′i. We will also define sums
X
x⊕
i := X
x⊕
i,A +X
x⊕
i,F , Y
x⊕
i := Y
x⊕
i,A + Y
x⊕
i,F , (B24)
and the random variables built from Xi and Yi, that is their sums:
X¯Ax⊕ :=
∑
i∈[n]
X
x⊕
i,A , X¯
F
x⊕ :=
∑
i∈[n]
X
x⊕
i,F , X¯x⊕ :=
∑
i∈[n]
X
x⊕
i , (B25)
Y¯ Ax⊕ :=
∑
i∈[n]
Y
x⊕
i,A , Y¯
F
x⊕ :=
∑
i∈[n]
Y
x⊕
i,F , Y¯x⊕ :=
∑
i∈[n]
Y
x⊕
i . (B26)
From Eq. (B19) we know that the measure µ′′ is a product of measures
µ′′i := u(x
i
A)u(y
i
0)u(y
i
1)P
i(aiF , a
i
A|xiA, xi⊕ ⊕ xiA, yi0, yi1) (B27)
what implies that X¯Ax⊕ , X¯
F
x⊕ , X¯x⊕ , Y¯
A
x⊕ , Y¯
F
x⊕ , Y¯x⊕ are described by Poisson distribution.
The respective averages over measure µ′′ read
EX¯x⊕ =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA ⊕ xi⊕, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)Xx⊕i (S′i), (B28)
EY¯x⊕ =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA ⊕ xi⊕, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)Y x⊕i (S′i). (B29)
Although the above averages are defined on the whole range [n], they depend only on their respective subsets:
EX¯x⊕ =
∑
i∈D(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)
[
δ
(
aiA, yˆ
i
xiA
)
+ δ
(
aiF , yˆ
i
xiA
)]
,
(B30)
EY¯x⊕ =
∑
i∈D¯(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA ⊕ 1, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)
×
[
δ
(
aiA, yˆ
i
xiA
)
+ δ
(
aiF , yˆ
i
1⊕xiA
)]
.
(B31)
We will prove now, that the above averages are bounded if the attack is done under assumption that the adversaries
are quantum and they attack in a qubit-by qubit manner (see Assumptions ASM3–ASM6).
Lemma 2.
EX¯x⊕ + EY¯x⊕ ≤ 2PQ |D(x⊕)|+M
∣∣D¯(x⊕)∣∣ . (B32)
Proof. We will separately prove that the first term of LHS is bounded by the first term of RHS, and later that the
second terms bound each other, respectively. The best quantum strategy for a single person (say, Alice) in a single
run of experiment is upper bounded by PQ, while the other party is asked to guess the same bit as Alice was asked,
so can copy her answer. We have
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EX¯x⊕ =
∑
i∈D(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)
[
δ
(
aiA, yˆ
i
xiA
)
+ δ
(
aiF , yˆ
i
xiA
)]
=
∑
i∈D(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)δ
(
aiA, yˆ
i
xiA
)
+
∑
i∈D(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)δ
(
aiF , yˆ
i
xiA
)
=
∑
i∈D(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA)∈{0,1}
Pi(a
i
A|xˆiA, xˆiA, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)δ
(
aiA, yˆ
i
xiA
)
+
∑
i∈D(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiF )∈{0,1}
Pi(a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)δ
(
aiF , yˆ
i
xiA
)
=
∑
i∈D(x⊕)
EXAi,x⊕ + EX
F
i,x⊕ .
(B33)
Now, for each i ∈ D, there is:
EXAi,x⊕ =
1
2
(PA(y0|xA = 0) + PA(y1|xA = 1)) ≤ PQ, (B34)
where we here used Eq. (7) of [7] (note the change of notation: our x, yi, aA correspond to y, ai, b there, respectively).
Analogously, for i ∈ D,
EXFi,x⊕ =
1
2
(PF (y0|xF = 0) + PF (y1|xF = 1)) ≤ PQ. (B35)
Summing the above inequalities over i ∈ D we obtain EX¯x⊕ ≤ 2PQ|D(x⊕)|.
More elaborative is relating the second terms of (B32). We begin analogously:
EY¯x⊕ =
∑
i∈D¯(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA ⊕ 1, yˆ0i, yˆ1i)
×
[
δ
(
aiA, yˆ
i
xiA
)
+ δ
(
aiF , yˆ
i
1⊕xiA
)]
=
∑
i∈D¯(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA ⊕ 1, yˆ0i, yˆ1i) · δ
(
aiA, yˆ
i
xiA
)
+
∑
i∈D¯(x⊕)
∑
(xiA,y
i
0,y
i
1)=(xˆ
i
A,yˆ
i
0,yˆ
i
1)∈{0,1}3
1
8
∑
(aiA,a
i
F )∈{0,1}2
Pi(a
i
A, a
i
F |xˆiA, xˆiA ⊕ 1, yˆ0i, yˆ1i) · δ
(
aiF , yˆ
i
1⊕xiA
)
=
∑
i∈D¯(x⊕)
EY Ai,x⊕ + EY
F
i,x⊕ .
(B36)
For each i ∈ D¯(x⊕),
EY Ai,x⊕ + EY
F
i,x⊕ =
1
2
[
PA(y
i
0|xiA = 0) + PF (yi1|xiA = 0) + PA(yi1|xiA = 1) + PF (yi0|xiA = 1)
]
≤1
2
[
PAF (y
i
0|xiA = 0) + PAF (yi1|xiA = 0) + PAF (yi1|xiA = 1) + PAF (yi0|xiA = 1)
]
=
1
2
[
(PAF (y
i
0|xiA = 0) + PAF (yi0|xiA = 1)
]
+
1
2
[
PAF (y
i
1|xiA = 0) + PAF (yi1|xiA = 1)
]
=PAF (y
i
0) + PAF (y
i
1) ≤M,
(B37)
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where in the pre-last inequality we have used the fact, that Alice and Frederic can collaborate.This can only increase
the average probability of guessing. In the last inequality we have rephrased the results of [7] as in Observation 4.
Summing up over i ∈ D¯(x⊕), we obtain ∑
i∈D¯(x⊕)
EY Ai,x⊕ + EY
F
i,x⊕ ≤M
∣∣D¯(x⊕)∣∣ , (B38)
as it was claimed.
We have shown above that the average number of guessed bits has an upper bound. We are going now to argue
about the concentration properties of the random variables which are involved in the above process.
We assume here that x⊕ is fixed, and results in the well defined sets D(x⊕) and D¯(x⊕). For brevity, we will
sometimes omit x⊕ from the notation of D. We will also define subsequences S′0 and S
′
1 of particular realization of
strategy S′,
S′0 := (S
′i){i:xi⊕=0}, S
′
1 := (S
′i){i:xi⊕=1}. (B39)
In the spirit of the above technical lemma, we will consider four random variables, each reporting the distance
between the theoretical average value of a number of guessed inputs and the observed number of guessed inputs for
the respective dishonest party on the respective set (D(x⊕) or D¯(x⊕)),
c1 =
{
1 :
∣∣∣EX¯Ax⊕ − X¯Ax⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η|D(x⊕)|
0 : else
, c2 =
{
1 :
∣∣∣EY¯ Ax⊕ − Y¯ Ax⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η| ¯D(x⊕)|
0 : else
,
c3 =
{
1 :
∣∣∣EX¯Fx⊕ − X¯Fx⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η|D(x⊕)|
0 : else
, c4 =
{
1 :
∣∣∣EY¯ Fx⊕ − Y¯ Fx⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η|D¯(x⊕)|
0 : else
.
(B40)
Due to the concentration property given in Eq. (B1) on the total measure µ′′, that is product of measures µ′′i
(see Eq. (B27)), base on which the joined distribution of X1, ..., X4 random variables defined above, we can bound
probability of 0’s as follows:
p(c1 = 0) ≤2e−2η2|D(x⊕)| =: 1(η), p(c2 = 0) ≤ 2e−2η2|D¯(x⊕)| =: 2(η), (B41)
p(c3 = 0) ≤2e−2η2|D(x⊕)| =: 3(η), p(c4 = 0) ≤ 2e−2η2|D¯(x⊕)| =: 4(η), (B42)
where the probability of the above measures is taken over the measure µ′′.
Now, thanks to the union bound, we obtain:
Corollary 2. For any x⊕, there is
P∼µ′′
(∣∣∣EX¯Ax⊕ − X¯Ax⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η |D(x⊕)| ∧ ∣∣∣EY¯ Ax⊕ − Y¯ Ax⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η ∣∣D¯(x⊕)∣∣
∧
∣∣∣EX¯Fx⊕ − X¯Fx⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η |D(x⊕)| ∧ ∣∣∣EY¯ Fx⊕ − Y¯ Fx⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η ∣∣D¯(x⊕)∣∣)
≥1−
∑
i
i(η).
(B43)
The above rather technical results are summarized bellow in the upper bound on the total number of guesses.
Namely, we will show that for a fixed x⊕, and an attack defining the measure µ′′ = µ′|x⊕ , the random variable of total
number of guesses defined as a function of S′(x⊕) sampled from µ′′ is bounded from above with high probability, as it
is close to the sum of averages that are bounded. Indeed, let us define the random variable of total number of guesses,
Z¯x⊕ := X¯
A
x⊕ + X¯
F
x⊕ + Y¯
A
x⊕ + Y¯
F
x⊕ . (B44)
We additionally define two other useful variables,
Z¯Ax⊕ := X¯
A
x⊕ + Y¯
A
x⊕ , Z¯
F
x⊕ := X¯
F
x⊕ + Y¯
F
x⊕ . (B45)
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Lemma 3. For any fixed x⊕ ∈ T (η),
P∼µ′′(Z¯x⊕ > B) ≤
4∑
i=1
i(η), (B46)
where
B := 2PQ
(
1
2
+ η
)
n+M
(
1
2
+ η
)
n+ 2ηn. (B47)
Proof. From the Corollary 2, omitting the modulus, we obtain a sequence of inequalities
1−
4∑
i=1
i(η) ≤P∼µ′′
(∣∣∣EX¯Ax⊕ − X¯Ax⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η |D(x⊕)| ∧ ∣∣∣EY¯ Ax⊕ − Y¯ Ax⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η ∣∣D¯(x⊕)∣∣
∧
∣∣∣EX¯Fx⊕ − X¯Fx⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η |D(x⊕)| ∧ ∣∣∣EY¯ Fx⊕ − Y¯ Fx⊕ ∣∣∣ ≤ η ∣∣D¯(x⊕)∣∣)
≤P∼µ′′
(
EX¯Ax⊕ ≤ X¯Ax⊕ + η |D(x⊕)| ∧EY¯ Ax⊕ ≤ Y¯ Ax⊕ + η
∣∣D¯(x⊕)∣∣
∧EX¯Fx⊕ ≤ X¯Fx⊕ + η |D(x⊕)| ∧EY¯ Fx⊕ ≤ Y¯ Fx⊕ + η
∣∣D¯(x⊕)∣∣)
≤P∼µ′′
(
X¯Ax⊕ + Y¯
A
x⊕ + X¯
F
x⊕ + Y¯
F
x⊕ ≤ EX¯Ax⊕ + EY¯ Ax⊕ + EX¯Fx⊕ + EY¯ Fx⊕ + 2ηn
)
≤P∼µ′′
(
X¯Ax⊕ + Y¯
A
x⊕ + X¯
F
x⊕ + Y¯
F
x⊕ ≤ 2PQ|D(x⊕)|+M |D¯(x⊕)|+ 2ηn
)
=P∼µ′′
(
Z¯x⊕ ≤ 2PQ|D(x⊕)|+M |D¯(x⊕)|+ 2ηn
)
≤P∼µ′′(Z¯x⊕ ≤ B).
(B48)
In the second inequality we have used Lemma 2. In the next one we have used definition of Z¯x⊕ , and then we have
used the typicality of x⊕, which implies upper bounds on the power of sets D(x⊕) and D¯(x⊕). This implies
P∼µ′′(Z¯x⊕ > B) ≤
4∑
i=1
i(η), (B49)
as we have claimed.
Let us recall now definition of F ′ from Eq. (B9)
F ′ :=
{
(yi0, y
i
1, x
i
A, a
i
A, x
i
⊕, a
i
F )
n
i=1 ∈ {0, 1}6n :
∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiA = yixiA}∣∣∣ > θn, ∣∣∣{i ∈ [n] : aiF = yixi⊕⊕xiA}∣∣∣ > θn} . (B50)
In what follows for clarity we will explicitly show dependence on θ using notation F ′θ.
Observation 6. Let the acceptance threshold be θ > B/2. Then
P (F ′θ ∩ T (η)) ≤ ′2(η) := max
x⊕∈T (η)
2(η,x⊕), (B51)
where 2(η,x⊕) =
∑4
i=1 i(η).
Proof. Let us fix x⊕. Then there is
F ′θ|x⊕ ≡
{
S′(x⊕) : Z¯Ax⊕ ≥ θ ∧ Z¯Fx⊕ ≥ θ
}
⊆
{
S′(x⊕) : Z¯Ax⊕ + Z¯
F
x⊕ ≥ 2θ
}
=
{
S′(x⊕) : Z¯x⊕ ≥ B
}
.
(B52)
The above fact is consequences of the sequence of implications, where the last follows from 2θ > B. We now invoke
Eq. (B18) and note immediately a bound:
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Pµ′(F ′θ ∩ T (η)) =
∑
x⊕∈T (η)
P (x⊕)Pµ′′(F ′θ|x⊕)
=
∑
x⊕∈T (η)
P (x⊕)
∑
S′(x⊕)∈F ′AF,θ
P (S′(x⊕))
=
∑
x⊕∈T (η)
P (x⊕)
∑
{S′(x⊕):Z¯Ax⊕ (S′(x⊕))≥θ∧Z¯Fx⊕ (S′(x⊕))≥θ}
P (S′(x⊕))
≤
∑
x⊕∈T (η)
P (x⊕)
∑
{S′(x⊕):Z¯x⊕ (S′(x⊕))≥B}
P (S′(x⊕))
≤
∑
x⊕∈T (η)
P (x⊕)2(η,x⊕)
≤ max
x⊕∈T (η)
4∑
i=1
i(η,x⊕) =: 2(η).
(B53)
In the pre-last inequality we have used Lemma 3 with 2(η) =
∑4
i=1 maxx⊕∈T (η) i(η).
Appendix C: Proof of main Theorem 1
Finally, after presenting all necessary definitions and lemmas, we are ready to state the complete version of Theorem
1 with the proof. Let
βη =PQ
(
1
2
+ η
)
+
M
2
(
1
2
+ η
)
+ η
=
(
cos2
(pi
8
)
+
5 +
√
3
8
)(
1
2
+ η
)
+ η
=
8 cos2
(
pi
8
)
+ 5 +
√
3
16
+
8 cos2
(
pi
8
)
+ 5 +
√
3 + 8
8
η
=
9 + 2
√
2 +
√
3
16
+
17 + 2
√
2 +
√
3
8
η
≈0.8475 + 2.6950η,
(C1)
for some small η chosen in such a way that βη ≤ PQ.
Theorem 1 (Security of Semi-Device Independent Quantum Money). Let acceptance threshold θ be larger than βηn.
Then, under Assumptions A1-A7 (see Section III E), where k denotes number of Bank’s branches the probability of a
successful forgery P (Fθ) is exponentially small in number of banknote’s qubits, and is bounded by
P (Fθ) ≤ 10k2e−2η
2( 12−η)n. (C2)
Proof. Using Corollary 1, Lemma 1, and Observation 6 we obtain the following bound on P (F)
P∼µ(F) Eq.(B15)= P∼µ′(F ′)
Eq.(B16)
≤ P∼µ′(F ′ ∩ T (η)) + (η)
Eq.(B51)
≤ max
x⊕∈T (η)
2(η,x⊕) + (η)
≤ 5η = 10e−2η
2( 12−η)n.
(C3)
Since there are many Bank’s branches, collaborating Alice and Frederick can use birthday attack in order to choose
two branches that have the biggest common set D. For k branches we apply union bound obtaining another factor
k2 what finalizes the proof.
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Appendix D: Proof of No-go for device independent quantum money
In this section we will provide more formal proof of Observation 1.
Proof. We will follow the standard proof technique used in device independent scenarios. Since all of the quantum
devices are untrusted the only way for Bank’s branches to verify the money is to use classical statistics of inputs and
outputs from quantum black boxes. Without loss of generality we can assume four-partite scenario with two Bank’s
branches B1, B2, Alice A, and Frederick F that all share some nonlocal box. We will denote device’s inputs as I
and outputs as O with appropriate subscript denoting the party. The general scenario can be modeled by probability
distribution of the form
D = P (OB1 , OB2 , OA, OF |IB1 , IB2 , IA, IF ). (D1)
In verification phase Alice tries to pass verification with branch B1, while Frederick tries with branch B2. Since
Bank’s branches cannot communicate, they have access only to the part of outputs. Therefore, the only way is to
check correlations from distribution
D1 = P (OB1 , OA|IB1 , IA, IB2 , IF ) (D2)
for the branch B1 and
D2 = P (OB2 , OF |IB2 , IF , IB1 , IA) (D3)
for the branch B2. We assume here that Alice and Frederic can freely talk during the verification stage. The
money scheme, in order to be secure have to disallow both Alice and Frederick to pass verification. Furthermore, the
conditions for passing verification have to be the same for all branches. Since there must exist a honest quantum
implementation (see Appendix E) for Alice with distribution H1, then Frederick could also pass verification using the
same distribution D2 = H1. To obtain such result, Adversary, controlling the source and measurement devices, can
prepare joined device with distribution D simply as H1⊗H1. Such preparation of state and measurement will always
break any device independent money scheme and cannot be detected by the Bank in any way without communication
between the branches of the Bank.
Appendix E: Honest implementation
In this appendix we will present honest implementation based on Semi-Device Independent Quantum Key Distri-
bution [7]. Let, for all runs i, the honest source prepare all states ρi
yi0,y
i
1
in the following way
ρ00 := |0〉 〈0| , ρ01 := |−〉 〈−| , ρ10 := |+〉 〈+| , ρ11 := |1〉 〈1| (E1)
where |±〉 := (|0〉±|1〉)/√2. Let us also choose an appropriate measurement Mxi , depending on the branch’s question
xi,
M0 :=
σz + σx√
2
, M1 :=
σz − σx√
2
, (E2)
where σx and σz are Pauli matrices
σx :=
[
0 1
1 0
]
, σz :=
[
1 0
0 −1
]
. (E3)
It turns out, as shown in [7], that, using these states and measurements, the optimal guessing probability equals
PQ = cos
2(pi/8).
Remark 5 (Connection with Wiesne’sr money scheme). In the honest implementation of our scheme we use the same
states as in the original Wiesner scheme. On the other hand the measurement settings have to be different since, from
[7], we know that Wiesner’s can not be used in the semi-device independent approach.
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Appendix F: Required number of qubits
This appendix establishes the relation between the number of qubits and the upper bounds on the probability of
forgery. Since from the Eq. (C1) we know that βη ≤ PQ we can calculate that the maximal allowed value of η equals
ηmax :=
−1 + 2√2−√3
34 + 4
√
2 + 2
√
3
≈ 0.0022. (F1)
When we put that value into Eq. (C2), for the trivial case of the single Bank without any additional branches we
obtain that
P (F) ≤ 10e−2η2max( 12−ηmax)n. (F2)
It is easy to calculate numerically that this bound becomes trivial when the number of qubits n is smaller than 463018.
Furthermore when we demand that the probability of forgery is smaller than some security parameter and we want
to assume more realistic scenario the number of required qubits grows significantly.
Although one cannot expect that such a large number of qubits will be available in quantum memories soon, let us
emphasize that the bounds used in the proof of Theorem 1 are not tight, and there is some room for improvement.
What is more important, we expect that using a more complex random access codes i.e., ones with more inputs and
outputs can lead to significant decrease of the number of required qubits as it is discussed in Section V.
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